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Abstract
The economy of the Modern Work Platform is becoming increasingly relevant 
due to the spread of information and communication technology. As a result, digital 
work has gained popularity as a source of employment, especially in an economy 
where finding decent work is becoming increasingly difficult. Computer algorithms 
are now being used to alter and change the way people operate in increasing job 
specialization, handling large-scale human labour in a distributed manner. In these 
structures, human works are delegated, supplemented, and analyzed using tracked 
data and algorithms. Building on emerging algorithmic literature and qualitative 
examination, this article assesses the mechanisms by which the digital network 
manages staff in the sense of Uber, Bolt (formerly Taxify). It describes the dif-
ference in the degree to which such platforms limit freedoms over schedules and 
activities relevant to gig work. Based on in-depth interviews with 41 respondents 
working on different digital media and a survey of 105 staff on the same platform, 
the study finds that while all digital work platforms use algorithm management to 
delegate and assess work, substantial cross-platform variation. Uber, the largest 
network for ride-sharing, exercises a type of control called “algorithmic despotism” 
that controls the time and activities of staff more strictly than other network distri-
bution firms. We end with a debate on the implications for the future of work of the 
spectrum of algorithmic power. It also addresses how algorithmic management and 
data-driven systems can be developed to build an improved workplace with intel-
ligent machines, with implications for future work.
Keywords: algorithmic management, digital platform, intelligent systems, 
on-demand work, performance evaluation
1. Introduction
The capacity to work enables human beings to engage in conscious constructive 
and imaginative practices that alter and define nature so that human beings can 
create their means of existence to fulfill their needs, which in themselves constitute 
the creation of material life [1]. An online job is a term that has been a vital ground 
for debates in the political economy of internet technologies [2]. The Automated Job 
Network is a framework in which businesses such as Uber, Bolt (formerly Taxify), 
Takealot, JumiaEat, Otlob, and others use cloud-based technologies to “match” staff 
on the customer platform [3]. However, the spread of interactive work networks 
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has been one of the significant revolutions in work over the last decade. Moreover, 
the Network Capitalism [4] is part of a broader transition from usual job security 
to variable employment conditions, including contract, contractual and part-time 
work.
The amount of data generated from several organizations’ processes and 
activities made it possible for software algorithms to accumulate and interpret data, 
making it possible to contribute to management and decision-making processes [1]. 
As a result, data-driven algorithms allow digital work systems to handle transac-
tions between thousands of network staff automatically. These algorithms assign, 
refine, and analyze the jobs of different platform workers [2].
We apply to automated algorithms that perform managerial decision-making 
and institutional instruments that assist algorithms in the practice of algorithmic 
management. Algorithmic management helps companies like Uber, Bolt, and many 
more oversee the platform’s multitudes of employees in an improved way, on a 
wide scale. Algorithmic management is one of the key technologies that facilitate 
virtual organization management. A variety of ride-sharing systems, such as Uber 
and Bolt, have helped connect independent, dispersed drivers with customers who 
need systems within minutes or seconds. Simultaneously, service rates change 
rapidly, based on how the demand increases from applications installed on their 
mobile phones.
Algorithmic management allows individual human administrators to oversee 
drivers at any place where the ride-sharing systems run, including on a global scale. 
As a result, drivers had little to no prior contact with the company’s members. 
However, they should communicate via online platforms (such forums) to enhance 
their social awareness of ride-share programs. This scenario helps one research what 
happens when algorithms delegate jobs, refine work activity through information 
analysis, and measure or measure job performance.
This leads to some key testing questions: are human workers (i.e., drivers) 
engaging and agreeing with work that is algorithmically delegated to them? Are 
human workers inspired or distracted by algorithmic optimization, and if so, by 
how much? How successful and accurate is the data-driven assessment of this 
algorithmic administration, and how do human employees feel about it?
The first move in answering these questions was to interview 41 drivers with 
Bolt and Ubers. We then triangulated their answers, interviewed 19 passengers, and 
studied the online driver forums’ archived discussion.
Our findings highlight difficulties and opportunities in the architecture of 
human-centered algorithmic job management, evaluation, and knowledge. The 
results further underscore the value of fostering sensemaking around social 
algorithmic structures. We use the results to explore how data-driven algorithmic 
management can create a safer working atmosphere for intelligent machines while 
providing potential work recommendations.
2. Research background: Uber and Bolt ride-sharing services
In Africa and most developed nations, Uber and Bolt are probably the prominent 
peer-to-peer ride-sharing firms. Uber has been operating in over 100 cities across 
37 countries between 2009 and 2013, and Bolt operates in more than 80 cities 
across 33 countries. Bolt is trying to create a social atmosphere among its clients, 
inviting riders to occupy their front seat and embracing the driver in a generous 
act of celebration. Uber creates an environment for more specialized drivers where 
social experience with the driver is not emphasized. Everyone older than 21 with a 
driving history of at least one year and a valid driver’s authorization will become a 
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driver on the network. Apart from this, inexperienced drivers are forced to attend 
short online video orientations via background checks. As soon as a new driver is 
admitted, the candidate becomes a self-employed agent, not workers. You are wholly 
controlled by where, when, and how far you travel.
2.1 Algorithmic management within the digital work platform
Under Uber’s and Bolt’s platforms, the management of ratings and ratings with 
information, decision-making, and appraisal functions of human managers under 
organizations is focused on three algorithmic processes: passenger-driver matched, 
interactive display of price-priced areas, and data-driven assessments [5].
2.2 Allocation of work on the platform: driver-passenger pairing
Drivers must activate their platform app to perform their function. This allows 
drivers to get their work done and execute it. According to Uber, “the nearest driver 
to this rider immediately gets the tour order in a 15-second timeframe to receive 
it,” until the user orders a trip across the portal (i.e., the smartphone app) [2]. But 
both Uber and Bolt deny specifics of the pairing algorithm based on proximity. Our 
analysis, however, showed that the algorithm could also have other variables. The 
passengers’ request contains information on the location, image, name, and rating 
of passengers.
When the driver agrees with the request, it will notify the passenger, and the 
driver will be able to drive to the position where the passenger is waiting for the 
driver to begin the journey. Both Uber and Bolt do not have the option or drivers’ 
desires, whether they choose to obtain on the network for those passengers or trips. 
Both platforms facilitate passive dismissal of allocated passengers only, i.e., if the 
driver does not want to approve the request, the accepted 15-second window must 
wait before a passenger’s new request is sent for the app.
2.3 Dynamic platform display of surge-priced areas
The regular fare defines the price on the network, which fluctuates according 
to a complex pricing algorithm, which dictates how the pricing is processed. The 
businesses are working together to make this feature clear to drivers and the public. 
This chapter would adopt the word Uber, i.e., “surge price” as demand exceeds 
supply, competitive pricing algorithms tend to rise, and price increases to support 
market equilibrium [2]. “Dynamic pricing” is used by Bolt Surge pricing will play a 
vital role in form driver sales, as the 80% commission stays stable during these high 
price cycles. As of July 2019, the two organizations, with a chart with areas shaded 
in various colors depending on the real-time price measured, high-priced display 
areas inside the network. To allow the demand and optimize the overall number of 
purchases, drivers can switch to locations with higher driving demands (and prices) 
than available drivers.
2.4 Rating and acceptance rates system used to monitors drivers’ performance
Once the ride is completed, all riders and drivers can evaluate each other through 
a ranking system built into the platform. The ranking system is a five-star rating 
system. Bolt points out that when a driver is scored, it is critical that passengers 
consider whether their drivers are generally polite and polite, that they navigate 
well, that they are safe, keep the car clean, and want to use Bolt again [2]. The driver 
also has the approval score, which is determined by the number of approved rides 
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divided by the driver’s total number of requests. Drivers are encouraged to maintain 
a high rate of acceptance of the ride by periodic incentives providing hourly pay that 
is assured if the driver’s acceptance rate is above a certain specified amount. Drivers 
with low average passenger rating and approval rates are subject to scrutiny. They 
will also automatically face deactivation on the network. Likewise, riders with a low 
rating score are at risk of being refused by drivers. Drivers have the option to disre-
gard incoming requests from low-rating passengers below their desired threshold. 
Drivers that retain strong passenger scores and approval rates are often elevated to 
advisors or recruiters. In addition to driving for the service, mentors and recruiters 
recruit new drivers and oversee the application process while receiving additional 
money for these jobs.
3. Methods
The study is focused on studies conducted between April and August 2019. The 
study was mostly based on 41 detailed qualitative interviews of those working on 
the interactive job channels (i.e., Uber and Taxify). We selected interviewees from 
among those who replied to the broader survey. A non-random survey of 355 Uber 
and Bolt drivers was performed, and quantitative data from this more general popu-
lation was also obtained. Following the claims made by [2], we started our research 
with a web-based survey designed to hit drivers on leading shared riding platforms: 
Uber, Uber Eats, Bolts, and others. These businesses consider their network staff as 
independent contractors and not employees.
We recruited drivers to take part in our mobile online survey in two ways. First 
of all, we aimed ads to Facebook network drivers. The benefits and drawbacks of 
using Facebook ads for low-wage jobs can not be overemphasized [2]. The prevalent 
use of Facebook in South Africa and other developing countries makes it a valuable 
sampling environment. It should be judiciously compared to the telephone-based 
means of interviewing [3]. We tailored Facebook advertising for our survey to 
individuals between 18 and 55 who spoke English and reported working on one of 
the two channels. The commercial was shown to 47,981 users, some of whom were 
shown advertising several times, and 4869 users clicked on the survey link, just 
above 10% of those to whom the commercial was shown. Of those who clicked on 
a survey link shared in the commercial, 476 described themselves as platform staff 
started the survey, and 355 completed the study.
Respondents to the study were not indicative of the entire employees of the site. 
Those who marked themselves as platform employees on their Facebook profile, 
and those who belong to communities connected to the interactive job platform on 
Facebook – the two networks from which respondents have been drawn – may be 
more attached to this job than other platform employees and may also vary from the 
people of other platform workers in different unexpected ways. Given the lack of 
data on this digital workforce forum’s makeup and experience and the difficulties 
of accessing this sample demographic through other means, the analysis presented 
here provides a significant, although the non-representative, reflection of this 
developing market.
One of the questions posed in our online survey was whether the respondent 
would participate in an hour-long telephone or in-person interview with R120 as 
an incentive for participation. We called for contact details from the interviewees 
who showed a desire to schedule the consultation. Of the 355 people who completed 
the online survey, most (245 or 69%) showed interest in engaging in the follow-up 
interview. To determine who contacted the 245, we tried to optimize diversity in 
terms of age, size, ethnicity, geography, political preference, and family household 
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income. We conducted interviews with 41 platform staff or 11 percent of those who 
showed interest, and interviews lasted at least one hour or less. We use pseudonyms 
all over to protect the anonymity of the respondents.
Although our survey is not generalizable to the digital network workers’ popu-
lation, interviews have helped us classify processes using reasoning rather than 
statistical inference and to achieve fullness [4]. Also, we found the same similari-
ties through interviews, which enabled us to trust the findings: that is, identical 
similarities in the interviewee’s account across various platforms. However, we 
equate different employees’ perspectives on other interactive job platforms or the 
same worker’s experience working on multiple platforms. Remarkably, respondents 
consistently emphasized Uber’s higher level of time and task management relative 
to other networks.
3.1 Passengers interviews
The responses were triangulated by questioning 19 passengers who used 
or are currently using Uber and Bolt at 6 locations in two cities (Pretoria and 
Johannesburg). On average, the passengers used the service 4–7 times over three 
months. Ten of the passengers questioned used both Uber and Bolt, 4 used only 
Bolt, whereas five used only Uber. The interview aimed to either affirm or disprove 
the impressions shared by drivers of how passengers use the platform, mainly how 
drivers are classified and their actions and attitudes towards price increases.
3.2 Analyzing archived data: drivers’ online forum
We analyzed the drivers’ details on the online forums where all drivers are 
registered to do so. This is because most drivers said in our interviews that the 
forums were the primary source of information and places for them to socialize. 
Two online forums have been observed: one that is not moderated by Uber and Bolt, 
like different Facebook communities, and the official Facebook pages moderated by 
Uber and Bolt.
One author who registered as a Bolt driver was granted access to Bolt’s (Taxify) 
and Uber Driver’s and Clients ‘new driver’ Facebook forum, which provides infor-
mation that is specifically relevant to the business. We also entered other unmoder-
ated private driver groups on Facebook by applying to participate as researchers. 
This was done to prevent being mistakenly posing as a driver. We have retained a 
single observation status during this review. To ensure that the method used in [5] 
was followed, we sampled 142 posts and responses on the online site, noting the 
algorithmic features chosen from the thousands made over three months.
4. Analysis
We triangulated our observations by conducting and archiving interviews. The 
interview transcripts [6] were also evaluated qualitatively. The posts excerpts were 
reviewed, and on the web platform, responses were analyzed using the qualitative 
data coding program Atlas. The dataset was then classified using three platform 
algorithmic features, and the data were then opened to the level of the phrase or 
paragraph around each function. We evaluated the remaining data to identify 
essential subjects, including social sensibilities and socialization. This lead to the 
introduction of a total of 289 definitions. The ideas were later grouped into 16 
themes, and emerging phenomena were clarified. To understand the connection 
between categories, we concentrated on eight categories related to our research 
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questions concerning algorithmic management. When checked at 10% of tran-
scripts (Kappa = 0.81), the final coding method demonstrated strong reliability 
over two coders. We have been able to settle disagreements between coders by 
debate.
5. Findings
This section discusses how drivers reacted by assigning work algorithms, sup-
porting details, evaluating work success, and how drivers socially make sense of the 
system’s algorithms using online forums.
5.1 Background: driver inspiration
According to the drivers interviewed, one significant advantage of working on 
digital platforms is the high degree of versatility that the system has when and when 
it operates on the modern operating network. The low level of commitments and 
dedication necessary for signing up for the platform is another advantage stated by 
drivers. Many drivers work on the system full-time, and others do part-time—some 
work for fun, some of them to feed their curiosity. Many drivers used the forum 
to coordinate their everyday routine in gaining extra revenue. In addition to the 
platform’s financial versatility, several drivers interviewed said they draw social 
motivation from the venue. For example., some drivers found meeting enjoyable, 
connecting with new people, and inspiring the group to participate.
5.2 Algorithmic management: proximity-based passenger-driver pairing
Our findings demonstrate how the openness of algorithmic assignment and the 
matching of drivers with passengers impact driver communication, workaround, 
and work strategy. It further describes the potential impacts of computerization 
decisions used by staff in a particular conventional working environment.
5.3  Collaboration with algorithmic management in terms of passenger 
allocation
A previous study argues that humans will collaborate less with computer auto-
mation activities than human beings. For Uber and Bolt, passengers are allocated 
to drivers on their applications. There is a guideline on the pace of acceptance and a 
cut-off period for approval, which motivates drivers to consider as many algorithm 
assignments as possible. One of the drivers interviewed explained the following: 
“passengers may only be refused if the choice can be made within 15 seconds. Both Uber 
and Bolt find it impossible to deny allocated passengers for different reasons. And if 
the position on the map where you pick up a passenger is displayed, whether you are 
unfamiliar with the area, you will not be able to decide within 15 seconds if you want to 
go to that area.”
Remarkably, one of the reasons that improved drivers’ engagement was to figure 
out whether or not the assignment of passengers made sense to them. While the 
passengers’ assignment was generally based on the similarity between the driver 
and the passenger location, other considerations led to the assignment. The follow-
ing variables are the mutual ranking between the driver and the passenger and the 
driver’s login time. This sometimes causes an appeal from remote passengers del-
egated to drivers who are not closer to passengers. As this situation transpires, several 
drivers testified that they did not acknowledge the “uncomplimentary” trip task, 
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considering that they must travel a long way (such as more than 10 minutes) to pick 
up a passenger. Another driver interviewed,
for example, explained: “I monitor where other drivers are when I’m not with a 
passenger. So, if I see between two to four drivers in area X and a request is coming from 
area Y to area X, given that there are at least two to four drivers sitting right there ready 
to go, then my instinct will tell me that one of two things would have happened. All the 
drivers transfer the trip request, which is unlikely because they cannot be sitting there 
and transfer the assigned trip. Or the GPS mapping was not properly coordinated by the 
system that is assigning the passenger. Then there is a mistake in sending the request to me 
who is over ten minutes away from the passenger instead of assigning it to a driver who is 
at least a minute away.”
The explanation above found it difficult to grasp whether the algorithm assigns 
the passenger to the driver in error or for legitimate purposes. That’s because we 
could not clarify how the driver app algorithm determined the assignment. Another 
driver interviewed believed that the task is often made by accident and that he 
opposes it. However, regardless of how far and inconvenient a passenger assignment 
might be, drivers can consider the assignment as long as it makes sense to them. 
For instance, one driver explained as follows: “When it comes to distance, sometimes 
I’ve driven as 15 kilometers, and I know that the fault was not the fault of the passenger. 
It happened that there weren’t many drivers out on the day I happened to be the closest 
driver at that time.” This means that the explanation for those passenger assign-
ments might have been significant, but at the moment, this was a feat.
5.4 Workaround strategies for algorithmic assignments
Drivers on the platforms recognize that the classification of passengers is depen-
dent on position proximity. This allowed them to prepare and collaborate to monitor 
the algorithmic assignment as part of the existing device functionality. They care-
fully manipulate when and when to work and when to turn to the driver mode on the 
app so that the kinds of requests and passengers of their choosing can be delegated 
to them. They limit the location they operate by shutting off the driver feature on the 
app while returning from a long journey, avoiding low places to prevent dangerous 
and hazardous conditions, and not going to neighborhoods where the bar is situ-
ated to avoid intoxicated riders. They restrict their place to suburban areas to push 
customers to bars. They get repeat passengers by phone into the travel arrangement, 
asking passengers to call for a ride while they are in the driver’s seat to be allocated.
Some drivers keep away from each other by monitoring other drivers’ GPS posi-
tions to avoid vying with each other for passenger demands. If drivers take a rest 
but do not want to turn off their driver app to benefit from the hourly payment 
promotion, they park their cars in the same place on the GPS, which stops them from 
receiving any trip order. Both Uber and Bolts express only basic assignment rules, 
such as “closest drivers are assigned to a ride.” This basic understanding allows drivers 
to maneuver around algorithm assignment strategies. However, the task algorithm’s 
lack of specifics seemed to promote drivers’ reluctance to make decisions, often giving 
them a pessimistic mood to the firms. One of the drivers explained the following.: 
“Uber is very tight-lipped on what is going on. What I’m saying is they inform us ‘we only 
assign it to the closest driver,’ but we don’t understand what is happening behind the scene.”
5.5 More understanding of the algorithm to the benefit of the driver
Our analysis showed that drivers benefit from a thorough understanding of 
the algorithmic assignment. Drivers with more experience and knowledge of the 
method build workarounds to escape unwanted trip assignments. In contrast, 
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those with less knowledge and understanding reject undesirable trip assignments, 
reducing their approval rates. One of the drivers, for instance, clarified that Bolt’s 
assignment algorithms weigh the number of hours the drivers have been online, and 
the proximity of the driver’s radius to pick up passengers increases the longer they 
wait for passenger assignments. As a result, he uses his knowledge of the algorithm 
to turn on and off his driver program periodically when at some stopping point, 
to disable the device from assigning remote trip requests to him. However, not all 
drivers have access to this knowledge. Our findings have shown that Bolt drivers who 
do not understand how the algorithmic assignment functions have attributed the 
remote assignment to the machine error. Many assumed that higher-ranking drivers 
would earn priority passenger assignments. These drivers are unable to establish 
workaround techniques to prevent the assignment of remote trip requests.
5.6 Algorithmic assignment versus preferred pick up
Our results suggest that drivers are usually pleased with the amount of power they 
have over the assignment algorithms. However, a few drivers have clarified that they 
are not happy that they have no control over the radius that the assignment algorithm 
attempts to send passengers to them. One driver interviewed, though, clarified that 
he wants the assignment algorithm to function to see all the incoming trip requests 
to pick the one that matches his choice from among them. He also clarified that he 
had a plan to select the trip requests’ position, and he learned the knowledge and 
comprehension of how best to use them.: “At some point on some days, there usually are 
many good trips within some areas. For instance, on Friday, around 6 pm in [area names 
hidden], there are many trips to and from the airport trips. So, you focus on those.
Another good thing is that if it’s a busy Friday night. And the best way to get that 
done is to take something that’s not in a close area, maybe going far, but then coming 
back in. It gives us the option for a change of pace.” Uber and Bolt’s algorithm assign-
ment removed this slight degree of power and predictability. He said that while he 
tried his hardest to be in those positions in Uber and Bolt’s system, there was no 
assurance that the system would delegate trip requests to him in those places. He′s 
frequently assigned trips outside the area he likes, and he did not want to travel to 
those places just for a change.
5.7  Algorithmic system does not cater to the driver abilities, feelings, and 
motivation
Some drivers clarified that hike rates are implemented in some familiar places 
instead of using the device in any community. They also explained that they 
frequently travel far to these places as soon as they get alerts about the increased 
prices. However, half of the drivers interviewed are not inspired by a rise in price 
notification because the supply-control algorithmic framework caters to their skill, 
emotions, and inspiration. It was also found that the surge-price shifts too rapidly 
and unpredictably so that they could not be used in a competitive way to raise their 
incomes. Furthermore, being in the surge region guarantees that travel requests 
would be distributed within the area. Any drivers have clarified that the spike price 
often disappears as they arrive in the spike region.
5.8  Data-driven algorithmic evaluation: performance evaluation through driver 
rating and acceptance rate
The guidelines used for the approval rate and the driver-passenger rating system 
benefit the system’s overall operation. However, this quantitative method makes 
9
Evaluation of Algorithmic Management of Digital Work Platform in Developing Countries
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.94524
drivers responsible for all relationships and is often perceived by drivers as unjust 
and does not have a meaningful or desirable result, thus negatively affecting drivers.
5.8.1 Treating all assignment rejections equally: an act of unfairness
The acceptance rate regulation requirement is used to encourage drivers 
to accept most of the requests, which allow more passengers to be allocated to 
their journeys, arrive at their destination on time, and inspire trust in the use of 
the platform system. The fact that the degree of approval of the assignment is 
sustained puts a high burden on drivers to consider most of the trips assigned to 
them. For example, one of the drivers interviewed explained why he often wel-
comed a request, even though it was not acceptable for him to consider it.: “I had 
no choice but to accept it. I accepted because I want my acceptance rating to go high. 
We are under a lot of pressure. I cannot give any reason as to why I do not accept it, so I 
have to accept it.”
Similarly, Assignment algorithms penalize rejection of passenger requests by 
drivers, which reduces the driver’s approval rate. However, specific drivers often 
have legitimate reasons, excuses, and circumstances that explain their reluctance 
to accept travel requests. For example, drivers can prefer not to welcome passen-
gers without photographs at night for safety reasons. Some queries are diverted 
to the drivers when a few seconds are left for the drivers to approve. This could 
be attributed to technical issues with the system. Drivers often send e-mails to 
the company’s representative(s) when they believe they have legitimate grounds 
to refuse the appeal, considering that they will not be penalized for legitimate 
refusals. Still, most of the time, their e-mail will go without getting a reply from 
the members.
5.8.2 Using quantitative data only leads to inaccuracy in quality of service
Our study indicates that the Passenger Driver Rating System builds faith and 
operation behaviors in network work schemes. However, there is not sufficiently 
metric to be used for driver efficiency assessment. Some drivers rely on passenger 
ratings as indicators to approve travel requests from passengers or not, believe more 
in higher-rated passengers, and exercise caution on lower rating passengers. Any of 
the passengers interviewed clarified that while they ignore driver ratings, the fact 
that the driver rating system is in place gives them a sense of protection.
The ranking system also allows the drives to provide a feeling of standard service 
on all their trips. One of the drivers interviewed, for example, explained: “I want 
to get five stars. So, I make sure that I am friendly. I relate with the passengers. I ask 
them their preferences immediately; they step in the vehicle. I ask them if they want 
me to switch on the Aircon or heater. Or they want me to roll the windows down or up 
depending on the weather. I also ask them if they will prefer that I play the CD or listen 
to Radio. And to ones that want the music played, I ask them what type of music they 
would like to listen to? I sometimes offer them sweets and gum.”
Drivers take ratings very seriously. High ratings like 4.95 have become the basis 
upon which some of the drivers pride themselves. Although scores below 4.0 upset 
some drivers and cause them to fear losing their work on the network, they fear 
being tracked, measured, and arbitrated by customers. These seem to have adverse 
psychological effects on those who have not scored close to 4. One of the drivers 
interviewed explained the following.: “you are forced by the rating to be careful 
and cautious. Because it looks like what you are doing is being monitored, rated, and 
judged. If your rating is low for some time, you could be asked not to drive for some on the 
platform and reapply for the job later.”
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Some drivers believe that their passenger scores are not a fair representation of 
their success in terms of operation and driving, as one driver explained: “It’s like in 
rugby, the line-up does not indicate the specifics of a player. A player could hit three runs, 
and three tries it doesn’t mean that such a player is a productive player.” Some drivers 
also explained that passengers’ psychological and physical conditions, such as being 
drunk, having a hurry to meet, or catching a late flight, are often reasons they give 
lower ratings after the trip. They also explained that some passengers interpret the 
machine anomaly or algorithm functions as bad experiences. This is because they 
are sometimes unable to manage due to errors (such as GPS errors, traffic jams, 
rising pricing, etc.) on their side. As a result, they give drivers lower ratings.
5.9 Making sense of the online platform as a forum for discussion
Drivers on the digital work platform function separately in distributed locations 
and, when they do, make use of internet networks as a significant avenue for their 
socialization. They use online communities such as Facebook groups, WhatsApp, 
Telegram, Line, Hangout, etc. as sites for different forums to address their work 
on the site and the algorithmic site management. One of the constructive aspects 
of making sense of the online forum is to explore how driver efficiency in terms of 
ratings and recognition can be strengthened and sustained.
Experienced drivers are often eager to exchange strategies and suggestions with 
inexperienced drivers who ask questions about boosting their scores. They’re willing 
to do this, relying on the expertise they have gained over time. One of the new drivers 
in one of the forums, for example, asked how to raise his scores after 74 trips in four 
weeks. Approximately 120 comments were made within three hours of the publication 
of the query. Some drivers sympathize with his feelings; some share their everyday 
encounters as part of the first challenge of getting to the platforms. However, several 
commenters expressed the specific tricks they use, such as designing a service informa-
tion manual for their cars’ back seat, heading to the Central Business District (CBD) at 
lunchtime on several short journeys building genuine connections with travelers, etc. 
Any seasoned drivers often make it clear to beginner drivers that ratings will be steady 
over time and warn them not to encourage tension to get too much on ratings.
However, in terms of knowledge utility and practices that use assignment algo-
rithms and rising pricing, they tend to have a lesser impact. Most of the posts that 
raise questions are concerned with how assignment algorithms and surge pricing 
work, understand the competitive display of surge pricing, and the fields in which 
higher pricing is often applied. Most of the real-time questions and conversations 
are about exasperating events — no travel requests in high-priced places or remote 
travel requests that entail long driving periods.
Much of the online forums’ conversation centered on offering emotional and 
social help instead of informational support. For instance, the driver’s post was a 
matter in which he was irritated at the trip request by the algorithm assigned to him, 
which forced him to ride from east to west of the area, even though he could see other 
drivers in the vicinity of the passenger making the request. Much of the comments in 
response to the post were worried about giving emotional support. However, there 
were no remarks to justify why the algorithm allocated such a trip to him. Company 
representatives usually do not appear on the forums to answer the driver’s questions.
6. Discussion
This section discusses how our findings will continue to develop and improve 
the architecture of algorithmic data-driven management.
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6.1 Designing and enhancing the algorithmic trip assignment
Myriads of Algorithmic Passenger Trip Requests for Drivers on the Automated 
Work Network, such as Bolt and Uber, are made automatically within seconds of ride 
requests. The regular and speedy approval of the drivers’ assignments ensures the 
platforms’ operation’s reliability and efficacy. Hence, it is the potential to maximize 
the number of passengers who can make short journeys. Our results indicate that the 
task is not based purely on the root of the task (i.e., person versus algorithm) in the 
digital job site’s algorithmic management. However, how the assignment is per-
formed and managed, how staff on the site interact and agree with the assignment 
[7]. According to the study’s findings, the details displayed on the computer, the 
constraint of the time to approve the request for a ride, and the approval rate jointly 
decides the degree of cooperation between drivers and the assignment algorithm.
Furthermore, our findings indicate that the openness of the algorithmic assign-
ment’s method can enable algorithmic management to produce a high degree of 
coordination and cooperation with drivers. While Uber and Bolt clarify that their 
algorithmic handling of assignments is based on the proximity of drivers and pas-
sengers, our findings suggest that there are other considerations that the algorithm 
takes into account. This is why passenger demands are often not allocated to drivers 
who are nearest to travelers. [8] suggests that the art of describing or encouraging 
staff to ask questions about each trip assignment may help minimize drivers’ refusal 
rate when assigned to a trip that is not close to them, instead of attributing those 
assignments to a technological glitch to the network work method. This is because 
clarity and openness will boost drivers’ negative emotions or contrasting ideas 
about businesses that run digital channels. Our results are consistent with previous 
studies on suggestion networks where exposure has improved users’ confidence and 
adopt suggestions [9]. This study also draws attention to new transparency implica-
tions that have gained little attention in previous studies on intelligent systems, i.e., 
the effect of transparency in algorithmic management and how to open algorithmic 
assignment leads to improved job strategies address limitations. Drivers who have 
a thorough understanding of the assignment algorithm can set up workarounds to 
prevent a less economical journey. In contrast, drivers who only have basic knowl-
edge of proximity-based algorithmic assignment cannot do the same.
It was also discovered that being autonomous contractors on digital work plat-
forms is a crucial factor in the network drivers’ preference and stability, which leads 
to a lack of control over the algorithmic management of trip assignments. Another 
consideration is the lack of familiarity with such systems. For example, a driver who 
acts as a driver and a passenger likes a mechanism that allows him to view and select 
travel requests directly. He assumes that the algorithm is now managing the choices 
that he will make himself. This is understood as opposition to transition, which 
often poses versatile, ethical concerns regarding the trend of emerging technologies 
that are harmful to people’s regulation for the sake of overall machine performance 
and the consequences of learning and growth while at work [10].
6.2 Integrating information support into the algorithm management design
Supply–demand management algorithms were initially developed to solve 
statistical optimization problems concerning non-human entities. In Bolt and 
Uber, however, they are used to inspire and regulate human behavior. This poses 
issues, as the supply–demand management algorithm does not consider the speed at 
which drivers run. Consistent with previous studies on a smart agent that sought to 
promote healthy behavior [5], the algorithm struggled to account for people’s feel-
ings of inequity towards higher prices and overlooked drivers’ social and altruistic 
Automation and Control
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motives. This highlights the importance of algorithmic management: (a) the speed 
and manner in which people work, (b) different forms of inspiration rather than just 
economic ones, and (c) the feelings people have about the choices that algorithms 
make. Also, some drivers did not trust the high-priced areas as they had more faith 
in their expertise. Transparency of how the surge priced region was computed in 
real-time could increase workers’ trust in algorithmic knowledge.
6.3  Integrating data-driven performance evaluation into the algorithm 
management design
Using driver ratings and approval thresholds, businesses can test drivers on a wide 
scale. In particular, driver ratings may appear to be a valid assessment tool because 
customer loyalty is a significant indicator of service performance and human service 
provider efficiency. Using only the monitored output data in assessing staff, though, 
has uncovered several problems that may arise if one depends too heavily on quanti-
fied metrics without further analysis of their meanings and complexities. Consistent 
with previous studies on letter-grading schemes or numerical appraisal of teaching 
skills [11], several random variables beyond drivers’ reach affect the way passengers 
rate drivers. The effectiveness and accuracy of the averaged group assessment, rather 
than the in-depth holistic review carried out by a human manager or peer, is also at 
issue. As P18 put it, “you are at the hands of unknown strangers, in [his other work] 
you are judged by people you meet.” Our research also reveals the pitfalls of following 
a 5-star rating system shared with web goods, content, or business ratings for human 
employees. Drivers felt that passengers rated conservatively as they did in online 
reviews; however, interviews with passengers suggest that they are more lenient and 
positive than drivers think. This misunderstanding indicates that a 5-star ranking 
metaphor and a heading may have contributed to incorrect comparisons. Finally, the 
long-term motivational impact of the ranking is still at issue. As the driver ratings 
were weighted over several journeys, the effect of one positive or negative ride was 
reduced, and the drivers in our study were less susceptible to changes in their ratings 
until they were above the minimum threshold.
Effective management offers working procedures and enables improvisation in 
response to changes and exceptions [12]. On the other hand, task algorithms have 
penalized all driver rejections of assignments, even though individual drivers had 
valid motives and situations for doing so. While we have not seen any significant 
problems with this lack of versatility in our algorithmic analysis assignment, it 
poses an open challenge in building flexibility in algorithmic management.
An examination is optional in most online rating programs, and many even 
miss the process. In the ride-sharing service, both riders were urged to score their 
service experience, and most of them did. Being held responsible for all communi-
cations, the drivers were well aware of this external assessment’s nature. Trying to 
offer adequate care with all customer encounters could pose psychological stress to 
staff. Besides, as comprehensive research on extrinsic incentives’ effect on intrinsic 
motivation indicates, an external device may undermine the innate incentive drivers 
may have and alter the sense they assign to their behavior. From the passengers’ 
point of view, the uncertainty of the provider’s motivation for friendliness and good 
service risks making the provider’s relationship more superficial and perfunctory.
6.4 Designing algorithmic management that supports online forum
Our study found that online forums have been the primary place where drivers 
socialize, ask questions about each other, and share information and strategies. 
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In most research on intelligent systems’ sensory and mental models, the focus was 
on individual sensemaking [13–15]. Our research indicates that social sensemak-
ing is another critical task that needs to be correctly understood and endorsed if 
intelligent systems are effectively implemented. Social sensemaking events at the 
driver’s forums adopted “fragmented social sensemaking” [10]. Many involved 
contributors have no overarching authority to put together various thoughts and 
narratives into a cohesive plot. This kind of sensemaking was useful in addressing 
rating enhancement techniques. There were no accurate or incorrect responses, 
and employees’ knowledge and learned and improvised techniques played a critical 
role. On the other hand, fractured social sensemaking fell short on topics where 
only an authority figure had the correct details. This highlights possibilities for 
creating organized online social sensemaking algorithmic features where individu-
als can draw on each other’s expertise.
7. Scope of the study
As with many research studies, there are certain drawbacks to this study. Our 
research work’s findings are derived from interviews with a sample of drivers from 
three cities in South Africa, namely Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban. We have 
used the study of archival records. We were unable to perform interviews with 
the official members or creators of both Uber and Bolt. The organizations that 
run and maintain the platform’s work processes were against their organizations’ 
policies.
Consequently, we conclude that this work’s results should be complemented by 
potential studies that will use various research techniques, such as tests, surveys, 
and ethnography. This study was performed in the context of the on-demand travel 
order, which is intended to improve the provision of the future of employment. We 
also assume that more analysis is needed in various institutional ways, such as with 
full-time workers.
8. Conclusions
Computer algorithms rapidly assign, refine, and evaluate work. This article 
discussed the effect of this algorithmic, data-driven management on Uber and 
Bolt’s new ride-sharing services. This study’s qualitative research results illustrated 
possibilities and difficulties in the architecture of human-centered algorithmic job 
assignment, knowledge and assessment, and the importance of fostering social 
sensemaking around the algorithmic method. The implications for HCI, CSCW, 
and Artificial Intelligent Systems research were discussed. We hope that this study 
will stimulate future work so that we can empower human workers to work with 
intelligent machines not only in an accurate but also in a rewarding and meaningful 
way.
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